A UNIFORM RULE FOR ENFORCEMENT OF NONCOMPETITION CONTRACTS CONSIDERED IN
RELATION TO "TERMINATION CASES"
Andrew J. Gallot
The enforcement of non-competition contracts has always been a
controversial legal topic. Traditionally, courts have been reluctant to
uphold these contracts because they restrict a worker's right to be
employed in a particular geographic area or occupation. The majority of
non-competition contract cases decided by courts are cases in which the
employee has voluntarily left his job. The goal of this comment is to
propose a uniform test under which courts can consider enforcement of
non-competition clauses. This test will be considered in relation to the
manner in which courts consider the enforcement of non-competition
clauses in the minority of cases in which the employer has fired the
employee, which will be referred to as "termination cases." These cases
will be examined in an effort to shed light upon the manner in which courts
handle non-competition clause cases in general and to show that when
considering non-competition clause cases, courts often focus on issues that
are only ancillary to whether the non-competition clause should be
enforced.
Part I of this comment illustrates the important issues that should be
considered when enforcing non-competition agreements by analyzing two
competing theoretical views of these contracts. Part II combines various
parts of these theoretical approaches to establish the uniform test that courts
can use in enforcing these agreements. Part III surveys various academic
articles concerning the way that courts handle non-competition clause cases
in general. This analysis will reveal that, historically, courts have not
focused on the issues deemed to be important in Part I, but that courts have
started to initiate methods of analysis that parallel the uniform test
proposed in Part II. Finally, specific termination cases are analyzed to
show that the various rules formulated to deal with these cases run contrary
to the uniform test and the overall trends outlined in Part In.
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AN ANALYSIS OF COMPETING VIEWS

The sale of labor is one of the most difficult transactions to regulate
and control. The common and statutory law surrounding employment
issues tends to be complex and often contradictory.'
The reason
employment law tends to be so confusing is that there are two fundamental
interests competing against one another in nearly all employment law
questions. With the sale of most fungible items, one does not have to
worry about questions of morality or compassion for the item sold. The
primary concerns in such a transaction are economic; the goal is to
structure the transaction so that wealth is maximized for the purchaser and
the seller.
Employment law essentially involves the sale of labor. Although
labor is, in the final analysis, a fungible good, the economic concernwealth maximization-is not the only interest involved.2 Courts and
scholars also express concern over the plight of the worker in the
transaction. The fact that the sale of labor involves the livelihood of the
worker infuses questions of morality into the shaping of labor law and
forces courts to deal with the personal concerns of the worker. 3 These
personal concerns in employment law will sometimes lead courts to
abandon the economically efficient result in a particular situation if that
result offends moral judgment by inflicting hardship upon the employee.
Labor is not easily commodified because a moral bond exists between the
worker and his work. As a result of this infusion of morality into the sale
of labor, 4courts are reluctant to consider its sale without addressing moral
concerns.
The interplay of morality and economics in the field of labor law is
apparent in the way courts have typically enforced non-competition
contracts. While there are valid employer interests that often are protected
by these contracts, and while enforcement of these contracts often will lead
to economically efficient results, courts are nonetheless reluctant to enforce
1. See Richard Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, 51 U. CFt. L. REV. 988, 989
(1984) (stating that many economists stay away from labor law because it is "doctrinally
complex" and inaccessible).
2. See id. (stating that many economists stay away from labor law because it is
"founded on a policy that is the opposite of the policies of competition and economic
efficiency that most economists support").
3. See Michael H. Gottesman, Wither Goest Labor Law: Law and Economics in the
Workplace, 100 YALE L.J. 2767, 2776 (reviewing PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE
WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW (1990)) (analyzing Professor

Weiler's critique of the economic analysis of labor law, which argues that morality should
shape labor rules).
4. See James B. Zimarowski et al., An Institutionalist Perspective on Law and
Economics (Chicago Style) in the Context of United States Labor Law, 35 ARIZ. L. REV.
397, 401 (1993) (discussing the "Theory of Moral Sentiments" as a way of infusing morality
into economic analysis).
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these agreements. 5 Instead, when faced with such a contract, most courts
will inquire into whether the contract is "reasonable." This analysis runs
contrary to the majority of contract cases in which courts will not inquire
into the reasonableness of a contract after it has been breached.6 This
inquiry into the reasonableness of non-competition contracts indicates that
there is a general presumption against their enforcement.
The different reasonableness standards used by courts are often
muddled and contradictory.7 The main reason for this confusion is the
interplay between the economic and personal concerns discussed above. In
non-competition clause cases the economic interest is represented by
courts' attention to the "right of contract" of the employer and the
upholding of the valid exchange that has taken place between the employer
and the employee. However, personal concerns are represented through the
courts' sympathy towards the worker and reluctance to limit his
employment opportunities. This infusion of morality often prevents the
enforcement of the contracts. 8
Before discussing the reality of how courts do handle non-competition
contracts, it is useful to propose a model for how courts should handle noncompetition contracts. Many articles have been written proposing such
models. 9 The model proposed here is different in that it attempts to
accommodate both the economic and moral concerns that surround this
topic. These competing concerns can be placed at opposite ends of a
spectrum of alienability, with economic theory at one end advocating the
complete alienability of labor, and personal theory at the other end
advocating strict regulation of the sale of labor in order to protect the
worker.'0 By examining each of these positions, a viable middle ground
5. See Maureen B. Callahan, Post-Employment Restraint Agreements: A
Reassessment, 52 U. CH. L. REv. 703, 704-05 (1985).
6. See id.
7. See Gary P. Kohn, Comment, A Fresh Look: Lowering the Mortality Rate of
Covenants Not to Compete Ancillary to Employment Contracts and to Sale of Business

Contracts in Georgia, 31 EMORY L.J. 635, 635 (1982) (discussing the confusion in
Georgia's non-competition clause law); Brett D. Pynnonen, Comment, Ohio and Michigan
Law on Postemployment Covenants Not to Compete, 55 OIHO ST. L.J. 215, 217 (1994)

(comparing the differences in the "reasonableness" tests used in Ohio and Michigan).
8. See Pynnonen, supra note 7, at 216 n.8.

9. See, e.g., Callahan, supra note 5; York Moody Faulkner, Comment, A Market
Analysis of Anticompetition Agreements in Labor Contracts, 1991 BYU L. REv. 1657

(1991); Kohn, supra note 7.
10. See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1849, 1857
(1987) (proposing a spectrum with Karl Marx's theory symbolizing the inalienable end of
the spectrum and Professor Posner's economic analysis representing the opposite end of the
spectrum, one of complete alienability). In this discussion, Professor Radin's position will
be considered as the opposite end of the spectrum, because Marx's views of universal
commodification cannot reasonably be considered in the discussion of a model for action by
United States courts.
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can be reached. This middle ground isolates the important issues courts
should consider in examining non-competition contracts and produces a
uniform test for courts to apply.
A.

The Economics End of the Spectrum

1.

Pure Economic Theory

The purest form of economic analysis is one that does not account for
any personal factors."a Actually, such an analysis takes a rather simple
approach to the law and human relations. Pure economic theory is most
concerned with the goals of competition and economic efficiency. 12 Under
such a theory, the law must assume that people are rational agents most
concerned with maximizing their wealth. Because of this fundamental
drive for wealth maximization, people will naturally strive to interact in the
way that will produce the most efficient results, maximizing the wealth of
everyone concerned. The result of this analysis can best be described as a
legal "hands-off' approach which advocates that courts 13and legislators
should not interfere with the natural workings of the market.
This approach leads to a philosophy that proposes nearly complete
alienation of all goods because of the belief that the free market will
produce the most beneficial results for society as a whole. 14 The theory
posits that market transactions will place property in the hands of those
who value it most, thus maximizing overall societal wealth, and that the
market should not be restrained by regulations that restrict such
transactions. 15 This concept of free exchange readily supports the freedom
11. The purest form of economic analysis is commonly associated with University of
Chicago scholars. "Chicago-style economics" is by no means a universally accepted theory
of law and economics, and it is not the only economic theory that has been applied to the
topic of non-competition clauses. See Zimarowski, supra note 4, at 417-18 (criticizing the
application of "Chicago-style" law and economics to labor law). However, "Chicago-style"
theory will be used in this discussion because of its hard line approach to law and
economics.
12. See Posner, supranote 1, at 990.
13. See Posner, supra note 1, at 997 (discussing the cartelization of the labor
movement). Posner's discussion of the National Labor Relations Act as a "cartelizing" of
the labor movement reveals his belief that excessive legal intrusion into the market leads to
inefficient results, which he claims are the opposite of the goals of "competition and
economic efficiency that most economists support." Id. at 990.
14. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Symposium on Law and Economics: Why
Restrain Alienation?, 85 COLuM. L. REv. 970, 970 (1985) (concluding that the only reason
items should be made inalienable should be to control external harm caused by the particular
item or when the item is part of a "common pooi" and its sale will directly affect the rights
of others).
15. See id. at 972.
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to contract, since contracts permit parties to voluntarily exchange property.
These beliefs also encompass the "economics" end of the labor law debate.
Employees sell their labor through employment contracts; pure economic
theory leads to the conclusion that such a sale should not be excessively
regulated by the courts through labor laws.
2.

"Strict" Economic View of Non-Compete Contracts

In relation to non-compete contracts, pure economic theory leads to a
presumption in favor of the enforcement of these agreements rather than
the current presumption against such contracts. 16 A non-compete contract
is viewed as a willing exchange between the employee and the employer.
The employee gives up his right to engage in a particular occupation in a
certain geographic area, or his right to use certain information. In
exchange, the employer agrees to supply the employee with specialized
training and information for the duration of his employment. Because the
employer has a tangible interest to protect, either in the specific training
that she is providing or in the information that she is bestowing on the
employee, the employee's forfeiture of his right to work in a certain area
can be considered a valid exchange for access to this interest. 17 Under pure
economic theory, the terms of the non-compete contract should not be
examined after the fact. It should be treated like any other long-term
supply contract that keeps a commodity off the market. 18 The fact that the
contract deals with an exchange of labor rather than a fungible commodity
should not change the analysis, and the enforcement of the contract should
be governed by the same principles that are applied to all other contracts.
3.

The Moderate Economic View of Non-Compete Contracts

The major problem with pure economic analysis of these contracts is
that it runs contrary to nearly three hundred years of precedent in which
courts have inquired into the reasonableness of non-compete clauses after
they have been breached.1 9 Pure economic theory, however, has been
modified to encompass concerns for efficiency and alienability while at the
same time explaining the reluctance of courts to enforce non-compete
16. See Callahan, supra note 5, at 705.
17. See Stewart E. Sterk, Restraints on Alienation of Human Capital, 79 VA. L. REV.

383, 392 (1993).
18. See Callahan, supra note 5, at 713-14. Callahan argues that non-compete contracts
should not be invalidated as restraints on trade simply because they remove a source of
labor from the market. She posits that long-term commodity contracts also remove an item
from the market and are not considered restraints upon alienation.
.19. See Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARv. L. REV.
625, 629 (1960).

724

U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW

[Vol. 1:2

contracts. This theory starts under the same premise, that non-compete
contracts are an exchange by which employees give up the right to work in
a certain area for the ability to receive specific training or information from
the employer.2 ° It recognizes that what the employer bargains for in these
contracts is not that the employee be prevented from working in a certain
area, but that the employee not use specific training or information that the
employer has supplied to him during the course of employment. This
moderate theory is in line with strict economic theory in positing that there
is an interest of the employer that deserves to be protected and that these
contracts should not be per se invalid.
This theory further hypothesizes that if the employer was able to do
so, she would not draft an agreement that included any geographic or
occupational restraints on the employee but, instead, would draft an
agreement that merely prohibited that employee from using specific
information or training.21 It would be difficult, however, to characterize
what skills the employee cannot use or to put in a contract what
information it is that the employee is forbidden to take with him. Also, it
would be nearly impossible to monitor the employee in his new working
environment to determine whether he is violating the contract by using
these skills or information. Therefore, non-compete contracts are written
broadly to prohibit any employment where there is a risk that the employee
could give the employer's information to a competitor. 22 This theory
justifies court intervention in these contracts after a breach on the basis that
the employer may have written the prohibition on labor too widely. This
would make the contract economically inefficient because the employee
would be giving up too much for receiving the information from the
employer, and it justifies court intervention after the fact to adjust the
contract so that it is efficient.23 The theory does not advocate interference
in the contract for any personal or moral reasons related to the employee's
loss of the ability to work, but instead quantifies the employee's
contribution to the deal and advocates adjustment of the contract when the
employee's contribution exceeds the information or skills supplied by the
employer. By not addressing the personal and moral concerns surrounding
limitations on employment, economic analysis alone does not present the
entire picture.

20. See Paul H. Rubin & Peter Shedd, Human Capitaland Covenants Not to Compete,
10 J. LEGAL Sa'u. 93, 96 (1981).
21. Seeid. at98.

22. See id.
23. See id. at 98-99.
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The PersonalEnd of the Spectrum

1.

Personhood Theory

One theory which infuses morality into the rules governing a capitalist
economy is the "personhood" theory of property. 24 Unlike pure economic
theory, personhood theory rests upon the idea that certain items are
inalienable and should be kept out of the marketplace. Items that are
inalienable are those which are so connected to the personality or moral
fiber of an individual that to assign a monetary value to them would "do
'
violence to our deepest understanding of what it is to be human.'"5
Thus,
unlike the economic theories discussed, personhood theory dictates that the
law should not only respect the free exchange of goods, but should also
endeavor to protect the inalienability of those items that are endowed with
personhood. Whether or not something is endowed with personhood
involves a moral decision in relation to the particular piece of property that
is being considered.2 6 Just because property is connected with personhood
does not mean that it must be completely inalienable. Personhood theory
of inalienability envisions a spectrum upon which on one end the most
personal items are kept out of the market, and on the other end completely
non-personal items are traded freely, and sale of items in the middle is
regulated to the extent that they are personal. 27
2.

Strict Personhood Analysis of Non-Compete Contracts

A strict application of personhood principles would invalidate the
majority of non-compete contracts. The freedom to work as one chooses is
a highly personal thing, and under personhood theory, it is something that
should not be given up contractually.28 Therefore, non-compete contracts,
which can be viewed as a sale of this right by the employee in order to
receive the training or information of the employer, would be morally
24. The originator of this theory is Professor Margaret Jane Radin. See generally
Margaret J. Radin, Property and Personhood,34 STAN. L. Rsv. 957 (1982). It has been
suggested that Professor Radin's theory of personhood is loosely based upon the writings of
Hegel in the nineteenth century, which first linked property to an individual's personality.
See Steven Cherensky, A Penny for Their Thoughts: Employee-Inventors, Preinvention
Assignment Agreements, Properly,and Personhood,81 CAL. L. REv. 597, 643-44 (1993).

25. Radin, supra note 10, at 1906.
26. See id. at 1908.
27. See id. at 1856-57 (suggesting that infants, reproductive services, professional
degrees, and blood are all examples of things whose "commodification is contested").
28. See id.
at 1907 ("[Workers who internalize marked rhetoric conceive of their own
labor as a commodity separate from themselves as persons ....
").
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wrong from a personhood standpoint. Thus, personhood theory would
advocate invalidating these contracts.29 Just as strict economic analysis
ignores whether or not the restrictions placed upon the employee are
properly fitted to the purpose of the contract, strict personhood analysis
focuses too much upon those restrictions and wholly ignores the interests
protected 30by the contract, which are the protectable interests of the
employer.
3.

The Moderate Personhood View of Non-Compete Contracts

More moderate application of the personhood theory has been
proposed in relation to employee contracts through which employees assign
intellectual property rights to their employers. This argument advocates the
invalidation of such contracts if the employee can demonstrate 31
a
personhood interest in the invention- that he has contracted away.
However, the argument also holds that if the employee cannot show the
existence of such an interest, then the contract should be upheld, and all of
the invention rights should revert to the employer as part of the terms of the
contract.32
This "all or nothing" approach could be extended to apply to noncompete contracts. If the employee can display some personal stake in
what he is giving up, which would be the right to work at a particular
occupation in a particular area, then the contract cannot be upheld. On the
other hand, if the employee cannot show a personal connection to this right,
then the contract will be enforced. Notice, however, that such a view does
not affirmatively assert the interests of the employer. The employer's
interests are only protected when the employee cannot express any personal
stake in the work opportunities that he is forfeiting. A better analysis
would respect the personhood or moral connection that the employer has
with the information or specific training that she is attempting to protect
and balance this against the personhood interests that the employee has in

29. Some states have or have had statutes that make non-competition agreements illegal
on their face. See David A. Cathcart & Christopher J. Martin, Contracts with Employees:
Covenants Not to Compete and Trade Secrets, R176 A.L.I.-A.B.A. LAB. & EMP. LAW 679,
704 (1989) (showing that California still has such a statute which prohibits agreements that
restrict employment opportunities); Pynnonen, supra note 7, at 217 (Michigan once had
such a statute).
30. See Philip J. Closius & Henry M. Schaffer, Involuntary Nonservitude: The Current
JudicialEnforcement of Employee Covenants Not to Compete-A Proposalfor Reform, 57
S. CAL. L. REv. 531, 546 (1984) (stating that courts focus primarily upon the reasonableness
of a covenant's restrictions upon a worker and do not focus upon the critical issue in noncompete clause cases, which is the protectable interests of the employer).
31. See Cherensky, supra note 24, at 601.
32. See id.
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working in that particular area.
Such a balancing approach has been rejected in personhood theory
because it is claimed that corporations cannot have the same personhood
connection to their interests as do individuals.33 However, when dealing
with non-competition clause cases, some of the interests protected can be
said to have a moral, personal connection to the employer who is seeking to
protect them. Non-competition contract cases usually involve local
companies or professional organizations that are seeking to protect a
specialized trade secret that they have accumulated through much research
and expense,34 or client lists35 that they have amassed through years of
work in a particular area. In applying a personhood theory moral test to
these interests of the employer, it would be almost hypocritical not to
extend some degree of personhood to them. It would be an affront to the
individual employer or the people who have worked for her not to extend to
them some personhood in the client contacts that they have made or in the
special training skills that they have developed. True, corporations are
economic entities, but any specialized training and information that has
been cultivated by these companies has been developed by its individual
workers. They have a moral connection to this information that they expect
the corporation to protect. It would be unfair to allow newer employees to
take this information with them to a competitor. This moral connection
should be considered when deciding whether or not to enforce a covenant
that keeps an employee from disseminating this information to such a
competitor.
11.

A UNIFORM RULE FOR ENFORCEMENT

It is clear that there are strengths and deficiencies in the arguments of
both positions at either end of the alienability spectrum when they deal
with non-competition contracts. However, it is possible to formulate a rule
that will combine the strengths of both positions into a uniform test for
enforcement. This test will focus upon the important interests a court
should consider when deciding whether or not to enforce these contracts.
Economic theories about non-competition contracts are valuable
insofar as they isolate the interests that are primarily ignored when

33. See id. at 660.
34. See, e.g., Insulation Corp. of Am. v. Brobston, 667 A.2d 729, 731 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1995) (involving a non-competition agreement to protect practices that the company
developed through using a sophisticated computer program).
35. See, e.g., Gelder Med. Group v. Webber, 363 N.E.2d 573, 577 (N.Y. 1977)
(involving a non-competition contract issued to protect the patient base that the plaintiff had
built through 20 years of providing medicine in the same community).
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36
considering non-competition agreements-the interests of the employer.
It is true that the effect of non-competition agreements is to restrict the area
in which ex-employees can pursue a certain occupation for a particular
amount of time after their employment has ended.37 However, the
restrictions placed on the employment of the worker should not be viewed
as the purpose of the agreement.
If the purpose of these non-competition agreements was to keep an
employee from competing simply so that the employer could gain an
economic advantage, they would be akin to involuntary servitude and
certainly illegal. Such contracts would be a malicious attempt by the
employer to limit where an employee could work solely to increase the
employer's competitive place in the market. The employer would be
limiting the employee's labor prospects, which are completely intertwined
with the employee's personhood, for the protection of no personal interests
of her own. Thus, the main purpose of these agreements cannot be seen as
a limit to where the employee can work, but as a protection of the interests
of the employer. The employer seeks enforcement of the agreement in an
effort to keep the employee from using business tactics and contacts that
rightfully belong to the employer. As economic theory reveals, the focus
of courts when considering these agreements should be on the actual
purpose behind the agreement, which is the protection of the employer's
interests, and they should only be enforced to the extent that they protect
these interests.3 8 Thus, if the employer has not contributed any specific
information or training to the employee, the non-compete contract should
not be enforced.
Where economic theory is deficient is in accurately establishing how
courts should determine whether the agreement correctly fulfills its
purpose. Moderate economic theory comes close to an appropriate
balancing test when it posits that the agreement should only be enforced to
39
the extent necessary to protect the quantifiable interests of the employer.
Under this theory, courts would balance the quantifiable interests of the
employer against the economic contributions that the employee has made
to the relationship. These economic contributions of the employee are seen
as "payment" to the employer for the particular training or information that
the employee has received.4° This approach is deficient, however, in that

36. See Closius & Schaffer, supra note 30, at 544. Closius and Schaffer argue, as does
this Comment, that the main thing courts should consider in the enforcement of noncompetition agreements is the interest of the employer. They reach this conclusion,
however, by comparing similar rules of the common law of agency with the enforcement of

non-competition agreements. See id. at 547-5 1.
37.
38.
39.
40.

See Blake, supra note 19, at 626.
See Kohn, supra note 7, at 636-37.
See Rubin & Shedd, supra note 20.
See Kohn, supra note 7, at 645.
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the employer's interests are tempered only to the extent that one can prove
that the contract is inefficient; in other words, to the extent that one can
show that the employee is paying too much.4' Such a rule fails to consider
the personal stake that both the employee has in his labor and the employer
has in the interests that she is seeking to protect.
Personhood theory illuminates factors, in addition to purely economic
concerns, that the court should consider in determining whether a particular
non-compete clause should be enforced. It shows the high value that
employees place in their right to work, and justifies another reason, rather
than simple efficiency, for limiting the enforcement of these agreements.
Enforcement should come only when the agreement protects the
employer's interests to the fullest extent necessary without infringing too
much upon the personhood of the employee.42 By illuminating where
economic theory is deficient, personhood theory need not be seen as
contradicting the test that the more moderate economists put forward, but
rather as complementing it. In essence, both the moderate economists and
the moderate personhood theorists seek to achieve the same goalenforcement of non-competition clauses only to the extent that is necessary
to protect the interests of the employer. Thus, these theories can be
combined to produce a uniform test that courts can follow when
determining whether or not to enforce these agreements.
Each non-competition contract is an exchange. The first inquiry that a
court should make in considering how to enforce a non-competition
contract is an objective one that isolates the particular components that are
a part of this exchange. By using an economic approach, the court will be
able to isolate both the interests of the employer and of the employee that
are at stake in this agreement. Second, the court should balance the
economic and personal contributions of the employer and the interest she is
seeking to protect against the economic and personal investments of the
employee in that particular interest. If the employee's interests outweigh
those of the employer, or if the employer simply has not given the
employee any special training or information, then the non-compete
contract should be invalidated. However, if the employer's economic and
personal interests in information and training provided to the employee
outweigh the interests of the employee, the contract should be enforced.
Third, if the contract is enforceable, the court should consider the personal
and moral stake that the employee has in his labor, and should limit the
41. See Rubin & Shedd, supranote 20, at 98.
42. See Kohn, supra note 7, at 646-647. Kohn separates the analysis of covenants into
two distinct parts. His argument parallels the one presented here in that he argues that
courts should focus primarily upon the purpose behind these agreements, which is to protect
the employer's interests, and then engage in a factual inquiry, in which the court should
determine whether the particular agreement is correctly formulated to protect those interests.
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scope of the contract to the minimal extent necessary to protect the valid
interests of the employer.
A hypothetical will illustrate how this uniform test would work in
practice. After decades of hard work selling shingles in the tri-state area,
David's Shingles, a small corporation headed by David himself, has
amassed a large client list. The client list is valuable because people only
need new shingles at an average rate of every ten years, and the list
documents the last time that each customer has purchased shingles. Use of
the list eliminates many costly sales calls to people who are not ready to
purchase new shingles. One of David's longtime salespeople retires, and
David hires Sabrina, an experienced salesperson, as a replacement. As a
condition of employment, David requires that Sabrina sign a noncompetition agreement, which states that if her employment with David is
terminated, she will not engage in shingle sales for a period of five years.
After one year, Sabrina grows tired of David's workaholic attitude towards
shingle sales and decides to leave to open up her own shingle selling
business within the tri-state area. David challenges Sabrina's new business
as a breach of the non-competition contract. Sabrina's defense is that she
will not use any of the information that she obtained from her access to
David's client lists.
In employing the uniform test, the court faced with the case of David
and Sabrina would first objectively attempt to isolate the exchange
underlying the non-competition contract. Because Sabrina was already an
experienced salesperson, it is clear that the only thing that David could be
protecting with the non-competition clause is the client list. Thus, David
was granting Sabrina access to this list, which would allow her to have
steady and successful employment as a shingle salesperson, in exchange for
Sabrina's promise not to work for a competitor, where she would have the
opportunity to use the knowledge she gained from the list against him. The
court's second inquiry would be to balance the personal and economic
interests that David has in these lists against the personal and economic
interests Sabrina has. Because David developed this list through years of
hard work and expenditures, he has a greater stake in it than does Sabrina.
Finally, the court should only uphold the agreement to the extent that it is
necessary to protect David's viable interest. Because the list only covers
the tri-state area, Sabrina should only be prohibited from selling shingles
there. Such a prohibition does not greatly infringe upon Sabrina's
personhood interest in her own labor because she is a qualified salesperson
who can achieve sales employment in another area. However, because
Sabrina has dedicated a year to shingle selling, she has established an
economic and personal tie to the occupation. The court should consider
this in determining the proper time restraint of the non-compete contract.
Application of the uniform test leads the court to uphold the contract
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between Sabrina and David to the extent that it protects David's viable
interests. Sabrina should be prohibited from working in the tri-state area in
the shingle business for five years.
II.

CURRENT ENFORCEMENT OF NON-COMPETITION CONTRACTS

Under the test proposed, courts would use a combination of economic
and personhood theories to determine the interests that are actually at stake
and then enforce agreements to the extent that they protect these interests.
The history of enforcement of non-competition agreements, however,
shows that this test has not been embraced by the courts. Traditionally,
courts have not considered the purpose of non-competition agreements and
instead have taken the position of the strict personhood theorists by
primarily focusing upon the restraints that these agreements place upon the
employee. 43
Courts typically do not enforce the
non-competition
44
unreasonable.
be
to
restraints
its
find
they
if
agreement
A.

Historical"Reasonableness"Approach

Looking at economic and personhood theories concerning the
application of labor law has helped to isolate the factors that a court should
consider in enforcing a non-competition clause. This section will look at
how courts historically have handled such clauses to determine if they are
acting in a manner consistent with the uniform test proposed.
The jurisdiction that most glaringly fails to consider the interests of
the employer when considering non-competition agreements is California. 45
Under the California Business and Professions Code § 16600,46 "any
contract which prohibits an employee from fairly competing with his
employer after the termination of his employment" is considered per se
invalid. 47 This treatment of non-competition contracts parallels the strict
personhood analysis that was critiqued in Part I of this comment. Such an
approach fails to consider the economic and personal interest that the
employer has in the information that he is trying to protect through the
agreement. The focus is wrongfully placed upon the restrictions that the
contract imposes, rather than the interests it is trying to protect. It is almost
as if lawmakers have been blinded by the fact that the contract limits the
employment opportunities of the employee. This becomes especially
apparent when one considers that California courts will enforce an
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

See Callahan, supra note 5, at 704.
See id. at 704-05.
See Cathcart & Martin, supra note 29, at 704.
See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 1997).
Id.
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agreement that does not place a broad restriction on where the employee
can work, but rather limits the information that the employee can use in his
new job to information in which the former employer does not have a
special interest. 48 Thus, while California courts and lawmakers can
recognize a protectable interest, they believe that this interest can never be
great enough to justify an all-out restraint on employment, probably
because of the personhood considerations surrounding the employee.
California is in the minority in adopting a position that favors a strict
personhood analysis. 49 In considering enforcement of non-competition
agreements, most courts typically apply the reasonableness test50 that is
outlined in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts:
(1) A promise to refrain from competition that imposes a restraint
that is ancillary to an otherwise valid transaction or relationship
is unreasonably in restraint of trade if:
(a) the restraint is greater than is needed to protect the
promisee's legitimate interest, or
(b) the promisee's need is outweighed by the hardship to the
promisor and the likely injury to the public.5 1
This test seems to be in line with the uniform test. The court should
consider enforcement of the agreement only so far as it protects valid
interests of the employer. However, this is not how courts have applied the
test. Typically, courts have divided the reasonableness inquiry into three
separate parts that consider: 1) whether the agreement is reasonable as to
the employer; 2) whether the agreement is reasonable as to the employee;
and 3) whether the agreement is reasonable as to the public.52
Courts have regularly applied this three-part reasonableness test in a
way that gives the second prong more weight than the first prong.5 3 The
courts consider the first prong as a threshold requirement-there must be a
valid interest of the employer for the court to consider enforcement of the
agreement at all.54 However, many jurisdictions then go on to isolate the
48. See id.
49. See Cathcart & Martin, supra note 29, at 704.
50. See Steve D. Shadowen & Kenneth Voytek, Note, Economic and CriticalAnalyses
of the Law of Covenants Not to Compete, 72 GEo. LJ. 1425, 1427-28 (1984).
51. RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 (1979).
52. See, e.g., Central Monitoring Serv., Inc. v. Zakinski, 553 N.W.2d 513, 518 (S.D.
1996).
53. The third prong of the test is rarely considered by modem courts. See Callahan,
supra note 5, at 706. Callahan posits that this consideration for the public at large
developed out of a fear expressed in early English cases that removing the worker from the
particular trade would disrupt the entire market and that this concern is no longer expressed
by courts because of the large size of the American marketplace. See id. at 724-25.
54. See Closius & Schaffer, supra note 30, at 541.
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second prong and consider the reasonableness of the scope of the covenant
only in relation to the restrictions that it places on the employee. Courts
that analyze cases in this manner do not adequately take into account the
protectable interests of the employer.
By giving the reasonableness-to-employee prong of the test a life of its
own, courts have shifted the focus of their enforcement decision away from
the actual exchange that is governed by the non-competition agreement and
toward the particular terms of the agreement. They are not considering the
interests that the employer is sharing with the employee in consideration
for the employee's promise not to work for a competitor, but rather the
abstract fairness of the contract. Courts have invalidated whole agreements
upon a finding that either the duration, geographic area, or activity
prohibited by an agreement was unreasonable, without even considering
whether the agreement protected viable interests of the employer. 56 Such
an analysis, which strikes down agreements if they are generally offensive
to the personal interests of the employee,57 only considers half of the
equation.
Some jurisdictions have made rigid rules placing limits on the time
and area restrictions that a covenant must have to be "reasonable." 58 As
long as the court considers the restrictions to be reasonable, it will enforce
a covenant regardless of whether it actually protects viable employer
interests. Moreover, in cases in which the employer has a very large
interest that needs to be protected, the court may not enforce the covenant
simply because it finds some parts of it, considered in the abstract, to be
unreasonable. Since there is no way for an employer to know what a
particular court will consider reasonable, it is difficult for an employer to
confidently write an enforceable covenant in some jurisdictions, even if the
interests she seeks to protect are great.59
B.

CurrentTrends in Enforcement

The recent trend in many jurisdictions has been to correct the error of
focusing solely upon the effect that the non-competition contract has on the
worker. Instead, some courts have begun to engage in a more proper
inquiry which first focuses upon the terms of the agreement in relation to
the interests of the employer and then balances these terms against the
interests of the employee. For example, Florida courts historically have

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

See id. at 544.
See id. at 543.
See Kohn, supra note 7, at 649.
See id. (describing reasonableness analysis in Georgia courts).
See Closius & Schaffer, supra note 30, at 546.
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exhibited an "extreme distaste" 60 for non-competition agreements and have
often invalidated them under the belief that any restraint on trade and a
worker's activities is unreasonable. However, under current Florida law, if
the court determines that there is an interest of the employer that merits
protection, the court will enforce the agreement unless the employee can
prove that the agreement is unreasonable as it relates to him.6' If the
employee can prove that there are unreasonable terms in the agreement, the
court then has the authority to reformulate the agreement so that it is
reasonable. 62
Ohio courts have established a test that is even more consistent with
the uniform test. Ohio courts formerly refused to enforce non-competition
contracts if they found that even one term of the agreement was
unreasonable. 63 This practice has been reversed, and Ohio courts currently
uphold contracts to the extent that they 64
are necessary to protect the
legitimate business interests of the employer.
Thus, courts have gradually been reforming their approach to noncompetition agreements to consider the interests of the employer in
determining whether to enforce the agreements. One glaring exception to
this overall trend, however, is found within recent decisions concerning the
enforcement of non-competition agreements in termination cases.
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF COURT TREATMENT OF TERMINATION CASES

Courts have been slowly changing their approach to non-competition
agreements. They are considering the interests that are truly the objective
goals of the contract, rather than focusing solely upon the perceived
unfairness of these contracts in relation to the employee. A clear and
significant exception to this trend, exemplified by recent Florida and Ohio
court decisions, concerns the enforcement of non-competition clause
agreements in cases in which the employer terminates the employment
relationship, which I have termed "termination cases."
Termination cases present an interesting study of non-competition
contract enforcement for three reasons. First, different courts have
formulated different rules for dealing with these cases, allowing for
revealing comparisons. Second, enforcement in termination cases is a
60. Kendall B. Coffey & Thomas F. Nealon, III, Noncompete Agreements Under
FloridaLaw: A Retrospective and a Requiem?, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1105, 1106 (1992).
61. See id. at 1119.
62. See id. at 1115.
63. See Thomas J. Collin, Employee Noncompetition Covenants, 27 U. TOL. L. REv.
415,421-22 (1996).

64. See id. If the Ohio courts find that there are viable employer interests to be
protected, but that the contract as written is unreasonable, they will rewrite the contract so
that it protects those interests in a reasonable manner. See id.
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65
relatively new issue in many jurisdictions. The case law is less extensive;
however, the few cases that exist on point are usually very detailed in their
analyses. Third, these cases provide a good illustration of how courts
continue to allow the reasonableness test to have a life of its own, separate
from what has been outlined as the true interests at stake in these cases. If
a court is using the uniform test to consider enforcement, the method of
termination of the employee should have little or no bearing upon whether
or not the contract is enforced. The method of termination will never enter
the enforcement equation because it does not relate to the exchange that
takes place. That exchange is the basis for the non-competition contract.
Despite this logic, courts place great weight on the method of termination
and allow that factor to override the other important issues in these cases.

A.

The Minority Rule: Termination Voids the Contract

The most stringent rule surrounding termination has been formulated
by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Insulation Corp. of America v.
Brobston.66 In that case, the court held that the method of termination was
a relevant factor to consider in determining whether enforcement of a noncompetition clause was reasonable. 67 The case involved a company that
68
was engaged in the manufacturing of roofing and insulation products.
The company began using a computer-assisted design system that was new
to the industry and asked all employees to sign non-disclosure and noncompetition agreements that would keep them from using any of the
information at a future job and would keep them from working in any job
where they might be able to utilize the information. 69 Insulation Company

("Insulation") fired Brobston, claiming that his job performance was
unsatisfactory nearly a year after he signed the non-competition agreement.
Approximately five months after his termination, Brobston began working
for one of Insulation's competitors-a direct violation of the noncompetition agreement.7 °
In deciding whether to issue an injunction to enforce the noncompetition agreement, the court initially stated a standard that is
somewhat consistent with the uniform test. The court wrote that it would
only enforce the contract if it was, among other things, "necessary to

65. See Insulation Corp. of Am. v. Brobston, 667 A.2d 729, 735 n.8 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1995) (stating that this case is the first of its kind decided in Pennsylvania).
66. 667 A.2d 729 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
67. See id. at 737.
68. See id. at 731.

69. See id. at 731-32.
70. See id. at 732.
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protect the employer's business interests."7 1 The court then reasoned,
however, that it would not enforce a deal it considered to be "unduly
oppressive on the former employee."7 2 While expressing both of these
concerns, the court did not engage in a balancing test, but it instead focused
solely upon the fairness of the covenant to Brobston. While the court
found that Brobston, who was employed by Insulation for over ten years,
"was privy to certain confidential corporate information such as overhead
costs, profit margin, dealer discounts, customer pricing, marketing strategy
and customer contract terms, ' 73 it still refused to enforce the noncompetition clause against him. The court held that the non-disclosure
covenant that Brobston had signed, which prohibited him from divulging
this information to any future employer, effectively protected this
information.74 If Brobston was working for a competitor of Insulation,
however, how would one determine whether or not he was divulging this
information or utilizing the specialized skills he developed while working
for Insulation? Moreover, how would this agreement have been enforced
on a daily basis if Brobston began working for a competitor of Insulation?
Insulation had an economic and personal interest in this information that
eclipsed any interest that Brobston had in it, and therefore the covenant
should have been enforced to the extent necessary to protect this interest.
Since there is no way to monitor whether Brobston was using this
information in his new employment or to enforce the non-disclosure
agreement on a daily basis, the only way to prevent Brobston from using
the information and skills learned from the employer would have been to
enforce the non-competition clause, preventing him from working for a
competitor of Insulation.
In declining to enforce the clause, the court relied heavily upon the
fact that Insulation fired Brobston:
The employer who fires an employee for failing to perform in a
manner that promotes the employer's business interests deems
the employee worthless. Once such a determination is made by
the employer, the need to protect itself from the former employee
is diminished by the fact that the employee's worth to the
Under such
corporation is presumably insignificant.
circumstances, we conclude that it is unreasonable as a matter of
law to permit the employer to retain unfettered control over that
discarded as worthless to its legitimate
which it has effectively
75
business interests.

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 730-31.
Id.
Id. at 734.
Id. at 735.
Id. at 735 (footnote omitted).
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This conclusion shows that the court improperly viewed the contract
as an effort by Insulation to protect itself from Brobston's expertise as a
salesman, an asset that is economically and personally attached to
Brobston. The court believed that the purpose of the contract was to
prevent Brobston from working for a competitor. While this may be the
effect, the purpose of the contract was to safeguard the knowledge that
Brobston had about Insulation's business techniques and client lists. The
court should have focused its analysis on how necessary the contract was to
protect these interests rather than the abstract reasonableness of
enforcement in relation to the employee.
A rule which invalidates non-competition contracts where the
employee was involuntarily terminated acts as an unreasonable hindrance
to otherwise viable non-competition agreements. In Insulation, the court
suggested that the employer's interests would be protected by the nondisclosure agreement but never actually explained how this would occur.
Other courts have found an employee's involuntary termination to be
dispositive of the issue of enforcing the non-competition clause. In SIFCO
Industries v. Advanced Plating Technologies,76 the court stated:
[B]ecause we find that the individual defendants were
involuntarily terminated, and conclude on that basis that SIFCO
cannot as a matter of law enforce the non-competition provision
of the Confidentiality Agreements, we need not reach the issue of
whether the non-competition provision itself is 'reasonable in
time and area, necessary to protect the employer's legitimate
interests, not harmful to the general
public and not unreasonably
77
burdensome to the employee.'
Evidently some courts completely ignore issues relevant to
enforcement of the non-competition clause and contemplated by the
uniform test. By focusing upon the method of termination, courts in states
where involuntary termination is seen as invalidating a non-competition
agreement allow an irrelevant issue to be dispositive.
B.

The Majority Rule: Good Faith/BadFaithDistinction

The majority of jurisdictions that deal with termination cases have
distinguished between good faith and bad faith terminations. If the
termination was done in good faith by the employer, the courts will not
consider the termination to be a factor weighing against enforcement of the
non-competition agreement. On the other hand, these courts, acting in

76. 867 F. Supp. 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
77. Id. at 159 n.4 (quoting Weintraub v. Schwartz, 516 N.Y.S.2d 946, 948 (N.Y.
1979)).
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equity, will refuse to enforce the non-competition contract if it is decided
that the termination occurred in bad faith.78
The leading case that adheres to the good faith/bad faith distinction is
Rao v. Rao.79 The plaintiff in Rao was a doctor who ran his own medical80
service corporation and hired the defendant to work for him as a surgeon.
The defendant worked in a separate hospital from the plaintiff and
developed his own client base separate from that of the plaintiff.81 After
employing the defendant for almost four years, the plaintiff fired him "in
bad faith" and sought to have the terms of a restrictive covenant enforced
against him to keep the defendant
from practicing in the hospital where the
82
defendant had been working.
Under the uniform test, the restrictive covenant in Rao would not have
been enforced. The facts as presented show no recognizable interest of the
employer that needs to be protected and, therefore, a restrictive covenant is
neither necessary nor warranted. The defendant built up his practice with
minimal help from the plaintiff, and the interests at stake in the case belong
to the defendant because his personal and economic contributions outweigh
the contributions of the employer. 83 Essentially, the court held that the
plaintiff's economic and personhood contributions to the skills and contacts
acquired by the defendant were outweighed by the economic and
personhood connections of the defendant to those same interests. The court
expanded its holding, however, to find that the good faith requirement
inherent in any contract formed in Illinois invalidates any non-competition
contract if the employer terminated the employment relationship in bad
faith. Since the defendant was terminated in bad faith, the non-competition
clause was per se invalid. 84 The court failed to state why such a holding
was necessary or even relevant to the inquiry concerning enforcement of a
non-competition clause except to state that non-competition clauses that
"become effective when an employee is terminated without good cause
[are] not reasonably necessary to protect an employer's good will."85 This
holding is erroneous in that it is not good will that employers are trying to
protect with non-competition contracts but rather recognizable interests in
training or information.
One could claim that bad faith by the employer violates the
employment contract in its entirety, including the non-competition clause.
78. See Property Tax Representatives, Inc. v. Chatam, 891 S.W.2d 153, 156 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1995).
79. 718 F.2d 219 (7th Cir. 1983).
80. See id. at 221.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 221-22.
83. See id. at 223.
84. See id.
85. See id. at 224 (footnote omitted).
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If there are valid interests that the employer seeks to protect with this
clause, however, it should not be invalidated so quickly. If an employer
terminates an employee in bad faith, the employee should be compensated
with money damages. It is not proper to compensate an employee by
allowing him to compete against the employer using information and skills
to which the employer has strong personal and economic ties, which is
what courts do when they decline to enforce a non-competition clause
because of a bad faith termination. In essence, the uniform test advocates
that the court separate the non-compete portion of the employment contract
from the rest of the agreement. It should be examined as a separate
agreement, an exchange between the employer and employee, in which the
employer shares information with the employee in exchange for the
employee's promise not to use it against her. As long as the employer has
shared such information, the employee should be bound to honor his end of
the bargain, regardless of how the employment relationship is ended. Thus,
a bad faith termination should not allow the employee to break his promise.
Instead, the employee can be compensated with monetary damages as a
result of the broken contract for employment, and the non-competition
clause should be enforced.
Other cases employ the flawed reasoning of the good faith/bad faith
distinction. As one court held, if "the employee's termination was
arbitrary, capricious or in bad faith, [the court] can 'lend the hand of
equity' in refusing to enforce the [non-competition] agreement." 6 This is
another way of saying that non-competition contracts will not be enforced
in cases of bad faith dismissal because it is unfair. The courts are willing to
rule this way because non-competition contracts are seen as "restraints on
free trade" and are "looked upon with disfavor" 87 by the courts. This
language indicates that in termination cases courts are harkening back to
the reasonableness test that deals solely with the non-competition contract's
effect upon the employee. They are focusing on issues of fairness and
morality solely in relation to the employee without engaging in the first
inquiry of the uniform test, which is to isolate the issues that are important
to both the employer and the employee in relation to the non-competition
agreement.
The error in this analysis becomes apparent in a case like Property
Tax Representatives, Inc. v. Chatam.88 In Chatam, the defendant, an
appraiser for the plaintiff, had specialized knowledge of the way that the
89
plaintiff did business and had close contacts with the plaintiffs clients.
86. Empiregas v. Bain, 599 So. 2d 971, 975 (Miss. 1992) (quoting Frierson v.
Shepphard Bldg. Supply Co., 154 So. 2d 151, 155 (Miss. 1963)).
87. Bishop v. Lakeland Animal Hosp., P.C., 644 N.E.2d 33, 36 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
88. 891 S.W.2d 153 (Mo. CL App. 1995).

89. See id. at 155.
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Instead of focusing upon these interests, however, the court's opinion
focuses upon what it held to be the "central issue" in the case-whether or
not Chatam was fired in bad faith. 90 The court concluded that he was fired
in bad faith and refused to enforce the non-competition clause without
having addressed the employer's need to have such a restriction to protect
his client base. 91
Another example of how the application of the good faith/bad faith
distinction can lead to improper results is provided by a Delaware case in
which the court held that the fired employee, using information and client
lists of his former employer, started a company to compete directly with his
former employer "[a]lmost immediately after his termination."9 2 Even
though the court upheld the contract in this case, the court stated in dicta
that if the employer had not had cause for terminating the employee, it
would have voided the non-competition agreement and allowed the
employee to compete. 93 This result would have made little sense. The
employee promised not to compete in exchange for gaining access to the
employer's client lists and information. The employer obviously held up
his end of the bargain, considering that the employee used this information
to compete against him.
Regardless of how the employment relationship was ended, a court
should ensure that the employee upholds his end of the bargain and does
not compete. This is especially true considering that by competing, the
employee is using information to which the employer has strong personal
and economic ties. These cases illustrate that a rule of enforcement that
hinges upon the method of termination of the employee simply ignores the
exchange that underlies the non-competition contract.
A different permutation of the David and Sabrina hypothetical will
further illustrate this point. Instead of voluntarily leaving her employment
as a salesperson for David's shingle company, David terminates Sabrina's
employment in bad faith. The courts that adhere to the good faith/bad faith
distinction would not uphold the non-competition contract in this case, thus
allowing Sabrina to set up a business and use David's customer lists to
compete against him. However, this would not be the proper result under
the uniform rule. The fact that David terminated Sabrina in no way gives
Sabrina a greater personal or economic stake in the customer list. David's
90. See id. at 156-158 ("It is a central issue in this case whether PTRI had 'cause,' or
'sufficient cause,' or 'good cause' to discharge Chatam.") (footnote omitted).
91. See id. at 157 ("We hold, as Chatam's discharge was without good cause.., that
the trial court acted within its discretion in holding that the non-competition clause was
unenforceable.") (citation. omitted).
92. Lehman v. Standard Forms, No. 13688, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 11, at *10 (Del. Ch.
Jan. 12, 1995).
93. See id. at *12. The court subsequently found that Lehman was fired for cause and
upheld the non-competition agreement. Id. at *14.
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interest in the list still outweighs Sabrina's, and the non-competition
contract should be upheld in order to protect his interest. It is unfair that
Sabrina is terminated in bad faith, and David should be ordered to
compensate her if this constitutes a breach of the employment contract.
However, Sabrina's compensation should be monetary damages and not the
right to use David's customer list, to which David has strong personal end
economic ties.
C.

The Uniform Test in Termination Cases

By focusing on the fairness of termination, a factor that has little
logical bearing upon whether the non-competition contract should be
enforced, courts stray far from the analysis put forth by the uniform test.
Moreover, by looking to termination, courts are considering an irrelevant
issue that further confuses their analyses. For example, one jurisdiction
adheres to the rule that if an employee was fired for good cause, then the
non-competition agreement will be upheld without any inquiry into the
reasonableness of the contract's terms, and that if the employee was fired
without good cause the court will then look at the terms of the agreement
and enforce it only if reasonable. 94 This court bases its whole analysis of
the contract on an event that has nothing to do with the exchange in
question.
If a non-competition contract is seen as governing an exchange in
which the interests of the employer are being shared and subsequently
protected, then the method of termination is irrelevant to the decision of
whether the contract should be enforced. Under the uniform test,
enforcement would be strictly based upon whether any interests are being
shared and the extent to which these interests need protection, measured by
balancing the employer's economic and personal contribution to them
against the contributions made by the employee. After an enforcement
decision is reached, the scope of the contract should then be limited to
account for the employee's right to engage in a particular occupation.
Under the uniform test, the method of termination would be irrelevant to
the analysis. While it does matter in relation to the overall employment
relationship, it has no direct bearing upon the separate exchange that is the
subject of the non-competition clause. Since the method of termination
should not matter, the consideration of whether or not this termination was
in bad faith is also not relevant to the enforcement of the non-competition
clause. This issue only serves to further clutter an already confusing issue.
Not all jurisdictions are as confused in dealing with the termination

94. See Central Monitoring Serv., Inc. v. Zakdnski, 553 N.W.2d. 513, 519-520 (S.D.
1996).
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issue as the ones that have been presented. In Granger v. Craven,95 the
court analyzed a non-competition clause using logic that parallels the
uniform test. The case involved an employment relationship between two
surgeons. The employer was a surgeon who had been working in
Rochester, Minnesota (population 20,000) for over thirty years. 96 He hired
the employee, who had no prior experience in the Rochester area, to be his
assistant. Under the terms of the employment contract, the employer would
supply the employee with a room and equipment, and ninety percent of the
employee's patients would be referrals from the employer. 97 The
agreement also contained a non-competition clause, which stipulated that
the employee could not work in medicine or surgery within twenty miles of
Rochester for three years after the termination of the employment
agreement. 98 After two years of performance, the employer ended the
employment relationship.
The employee continued to 99
work in the
agreement.
non-competition
the
of
violation
in
area
Rochester
The lower court refused to uphold the agreement for public policy
reasons, stating that the employer had no right to limit where the employeesurgeon could practice, especially considering that the employer ended the
employment relationship. 1°° However, the state supreme court overruled
this decision. 10 1 It held that the employee should not be allowed to threaten
the employer's practice by continuing to engage in surgery in the Rochester
area. 1°2 Instead of merely focusing on the perceived fairness issues
concerning the employee, the court considered the "nearly [thirty] years of
professional effort" that the employer had expended in establishing his
reputation and patient base. 10 3 The court held:
It is obvious, therefore, that, when he employed defendant as an
assistant, plaintiff had a legitimate interest to protect. The
presence of such an interest is the first thing to look for when
such a contract as this is challenged. Its presence is necessary to
uphold the agreement and make it enforceable in equity or at

95. 199 N.W. 10 (Minn. 1924).
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

See id. at 11.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 13.

102. See id. at 12-13. "It would be most uncomplimentary to defendant to suppose that
he would not, were he to open an office in Rochester, attract to himself at once and
automatically, a substantial number of plaintiff's patients.... That consideration shows both
the propriety of the restrictive covenant, and the sureness with which irreparable injury to
plaintiff will follow unless defendant is restrained by injunction from a breach of that
covenant." Id.
103. See id. at 12.
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law.'04
Once the court recognized that the employer had a recognizable
interest to protect, it considered the scope of the agreement in relation to
the interest being protected and held that the three-year, twenty-mile
restriction was reasonable. 0 5 The court virtually ignored the method of
termination and instead focused upon the actual interests at stake to
determine whether the non-competition portion of the employment
agreement should have been enforced. Such analysis is nearly identical to
the uniform test proposed.
Courts in Florida have also refused to consider the termination
question with respect to whether a non-competition clause should be
enforced. In Twenty Four Collection v. Keller,1°6 Keller was an employee
of the plaintiff, a chain of retail stores in South Florida.1°7 Her employment
contract had a non-competition clause which prohibited her from working
for one of Twenty Four's competitors for two years after the termination of
her employment. 0 8 After working at Twenty Four Collection for eighteen
months, Keller was discharged and subsequently went to work for one of
its competitors. 1°9 In upholding the employment contract and granting
Twenty Four an injunction against Keller, the court did not even consider
the method of termination. It found that if Keller were to be allowed to
work for a competitor, Twenty Four's injuries would "stem not only from
solicitation of old customers, but use in a rival business of procedures,
methods, trade practices, trade secrets and the like." 110 Based upon this
injury, the court upheld the non-competition contract, which it believed to
be reasonable and necessary to protect these viable interests.
A focus upon the method of termination in non-competition clause
cases clouds the issues that are at stake, leads to abstract and confusing
rules, and shifts the court's attention away from the issues that are really
important in such cases. In Insulation,"' the court considered the method
of termination to be a major point of contention in the case. The court
refused to uphold the non-competition contract partly because it found that
when an employer fires an employee, the employer is considering the
employee to be worthless. Therefore, the employer should not have an
interest in whether the worthless employee works for a competitor. This
logic is flawed because even a worthless employee can take with him the
104. See id. (citation omitted).
105. See id.
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107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

389 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
See id. at 1062.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 1063.
667 A.2d 729 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
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employer's trade secrets, training, and customer lists. As the dissent stated
in Insulation: "the majority holds that an employer needs no protection
against a worthless employee. However, that is not the proper focus. It is
the discharged employee's knowledge of the business which is being
restricted."' 2 What this overview of termination cases shows is that in the
area of termination cases, courts often place too much weight upon issues
that do not directly concern the enforcement of the non-competition clause,
while ignoring issues that are central to its enforcement.
V.

CONCLUSION

When dealing with non-competition agreements, courts should focus
upon the actual exchange that is the basis of the agreement. The employer
agrees to provide the employee with training, experience, or information in
consideration for the employee's promise not to work in a situation where
he could provide that information to a competitor. Under the uniform test
proposed, courts would consider the economic and personal interests of the
employer in the information or particular training that she is trying to
protect, and balance that against the economic and personal interest of the
employee in that information or training. By doing this, the court could
determine which interest, if any, needs to be protected. The court would
then enforce the non-competition agreement only to the extent necessary to
protect the viable interest of the employer that remains after the balancing
test. A look at how courts have historically treated non-competition
agreements reveals that they tend to focus too greatly upon the
reasonableness of the agreement in relation to the employee, rather than in
relation to the employer's interests. Recent trends in case law, however,
show courts granting greater attention to the recognizable interests of the
employer. The way courts handle termination cases runs opposite to this
trend, and shows how rules surrounding the enforcement of noncompetition agreements can become clouded and confused when courts
refrain from focusing upon the true purpose of these agreements. Courts
should use the uniform test and center their inquiry in non-competition
contract cases around the actual exchange that took place. This is
especially true in termination cases where an issue that should have no
bearing on the dispute has been allowed to dominate the litigation.

112. Id. at 738 (Del Sole, J., dissenting).

